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Abstract
With decentralized cryptocurrencies, an increasingly important problem is how to design communication-
efficient Byzantine Agreement (BA) protocols: in this paper, communication efficiency means that the
number of pairwise messages necessary for reaching agreement is subquadratic in the total number of
players n (or alternatively, only sublinear number of nodes need to multicast messages to all other nodes).
A few existing works have shown how to achieve subquadratic BA under an adaptive adversary, includ-
ing the breakthrough result by King and Saia (PODC’10), the celebrated Nakamoto consensus protocol,
and a few proof-of-stake protocols such as Algorand.
Intriguingly, all these subquadratic protocols coincidentally make a common relaxation about the
adaptivity of the attacker, that is, if an honest node sends a messagem in some round r, the attacker may
adaptively corrupt the node and make the now-corrupt node send additional messages in the same round,
but it cannot erase the message m that was already sent — henceforth we say that such an adversary
cannot perform “after-the-fact removal”. By contrast, most natural (super-)quadratic BA protocols in
the literature can be proven secure under a strongly adaptive adversary capable of after-the-fact removal.
Besides the above relaxation, all known subquadratic protocols make additional strong assumptions such
as plain or proof-of-work random oracles and/or the ability of honest nodes to erase secrets frommemory
(henceforth called the “memory-erasure” model). In this paper, we first prove that in fact, disallowing
after-the-fact removal is necessary for achieving subquadratic-communicationBA. Moreover, this lower
bound holds in a very strong sense, even when allowing setup assumptions such as PKI, random oracles,
or memory-erasures.
Next, we show new upper bound results that improve existing communication-efficient BA construc-
tions, assuming, of course, that the adversary cannot perform after-the-fact removal. In our protocol,
only polylogarithmically many nodes need to multicast messages to other nodes. We remove assump-
tions such as random oracles or memory-erasure, and additionally achieve near-optimal resilience and
expected constant round. In comparison, even when making very strong assumptions no prior work can
achieve all these properties.
Our BA protocol relies on standard cryptographic assumptions and PKI. We further justify our setup
assumption by proving that a PKI (or some setup assumption) is necessary for achieving subquadratic
multicast-based BA (i.e., all protocol messages are multicast to other nodes)
1 Introduction
Byzantine agreement (BA) [3, 13, 14, 25] is a central abstraction in distributed systems. Roughly speaking,
in (binary) BA, every player receives an input bit that is either 0 or 1. The players’ goal is to agree on a
bit such that the following properties are satisfied over all but a negligible (in some security parameter κ)
fraction of executions: 1) consistency/safety: all honest players output the same bit, 2) validity: if all honest
nodes receive the same input bit b, then all honest nodes output b.
Typical BA protocols [7, 13, 14] require all players to send messages to all other players, and thus,
n-player BA requires at least n2 communication complexity. Such protocol are thus not well suited for
large-scale distributed systems (e.g., decentralized cryptocurrencies). A fundamental problem is to design
BA protocols with improved communication complexity. In a model with static corruption, this is relatively
easy: for example, if there is a trusted common random string (CRS) that is chosen independently of the
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adversary’s corruption choices, we can use the CRS to select a small, poly log κ-sized committee of players,
and then run any BA protocol among the committee (recall that κ is the security parameter). Finally the
committee members may send their outputs to all other “non-committee” players who could then output
the majority bit. Various elegant works have investigated how to weaken or remove the trusted set-up
assumptions required for such a committee election and still retain small bandwidth [8, 22, 23].
Such a committee-based approach, however, fails if we consider an adaptive attacker. Such an attacker
can simply observe what nodes are on the committee, then corrupt them, and thereby control the whole
committee! A natural and long-standing open question is thus whether subquadratic communication is
possible w.r.t. an adaptive attacker:
Does there exist a BA protocol with subquadratic communication complexity that resists adaptive
corruption of players?
This question has been partially answered in a few prior works [9, 11, 17, 22, 28]. First, in 2010, a
breakthrough work by King and Saia [22] presented a BA protocol with communication complexity O(n1.5).
More recent works studied practical constructions motivated by cryptocurrency applications: notably the
celebrated Nakamoto consensus [17, 28] can reach agreement in n · poly log κ amount of communication
assuming idealized proof-of-work. Subsequently several so-called “proof-of-stake” constructions [9, 11] in
essence also showed how to realize BA with n · poly log κ communication in the PKI model. All of the
above works can tolerate 1/3 to 1/2 fraction of adaptively corrupted nodes.
What is both intriguing and unsatisfying is that all these works happen to make a common relaxing
assumption about the adaptivity of the adversary, namely, if adversary adaptively corrupts an honest node
i who has just sent a message m in round r, the adversary is unable to erase the honest message m sent in
round r. Henceforth we say that such an adversary is incapable of after-the-fact removal. In comparison,
many natural Ω(n2)-communication BA protocols [1,13,21] can be proven secure w.r.t. a strongly adaptive
adversary capable of after-the-fact removal. That is, if an honest node i sends a message m in round r, the
adversary (e.g., who controls the egress routers of many nodes) can observe m and then decide to corrupt i
and erase the message m that node i has just sent in round r. This mismatch in model naturally raises the
following question:
Is disallowing after-the-fact removal necessary for achieving subquadratic-communication BA?
Main result 1: disallowing “after-the-fact” removal is necessary. Our first contribution is a new lower
bound showing that any (possibly randomized) BA protocol must incur at least Ω(f2) communication in the
presence of a strongly adaptive adversary capable of performing after-the-fact removal where f < n denotes
the number of corrupt nodes.
The proof of our lower bound is inspired by the work of Dolev and Reischuk [12], who showed that
any deterministic BA protocol must incur Ω(f2) communication even against a static adversary. Their
lower bound fails for randomized protocols. We show a similar communication complexity lower bound
for randomized protocols, but now additionally assuming that the adversary is strongly adaptive and can
perform after-the-fact removals. We remark our lower bound (as well as Dolev-Reischuk) holds in a very
strong sense: even when making common (possibly very strong) setup assumptions such as the existence
of (even proof-of-work) random oracles and even under a more constrained omission adversary who is only
allowed to omit messages sent from and to corrupt nodes, but does not deviate from the protocol otherwise.
Theorem 1 (Impossibility of BA with subquadratic communication w.r.t. a strongly adaptive adversary).
Any (possibly randomized) BA protocol must in expectation incur at least Ω(f2) communication in the
presence of a strongly adaptive adversary capable of performing after-the-fact removal, where f < n
denotes the number of corrupt nodes.
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Main result 2: near-optimal subquadratic BA with minimal assumptions. On the upper bound front, we
present subquadratic BA protocols that, besides the necessary “no after-the-fact removal” assumption, rely
only on standard cryptographic and setup assumptions. Furthermore, our protocol achieves:
• Near-optimal resilience i.e., resisting at most 1/2 fraction of corrupt nodes in a synchronous network
1, and
• Expected constant round.
Our results improve existing works in two major aspects. First, besides “no after-the-fact removal”,
all existing works [9,11,22,28] make very strong additional assumptions. Nakamoto consensus [17,28] as-
sumes idealized proofs-of-work. Some works assume random oracles [9,11]. Other works [9,22] assume the
ability of honest nodes to securely erase secrets from memory and that adaptive corruption cannot take place
in a round between when an honest node sends a message and when it erases secrets from memory. Such
a model is commonly referred to in the cryptography literature as the “erasure model” and as “ephemeral
keys” in Chen and Micali [9]. 2 In this paper, to avoid confusing the term with “after-the-fact message
removal”, we rename it the memory-erasure model
More importantly, even with the above strong assumptions, no prior work can simultaneously achieve
the above properties. Nakamoto style protocols, either proof-of-work [28] or proof-of-stake-based [11],
cannot achieve expected constant round. King-Saia [22] and Chen-Micali [9] protocols have sub-optimal
tolerate of f < (13−ǫ)n. Micali-Vaikuntanathan [27], if cast into the Algorand framework, tolerates minority
corruption but sacrifices expected constant round.
The multicast model. In large-scale peer-to-peer network, it is usually much cheaper for a node to mul-
ticast the same message to everyone, rather than unicasting n different messages (of the same length) to
n different nodes — even though the two have identical classical communication complexity! Indeed, all
known consensus protocols deployed in a decentralized environment (e.g. Bitcoin, Ethereum) work in the
multicast fashion.
A multicast-based protocol is said to have multicast communication complexity C (or multicast com-
plexity for short) iff except with negligible (in κ) probability, the total number of bits multicast by all honest
players is upper bounded by C . Clearly, a protocol with multicast communication complexity C has classi-
cal communication complexity nC . A communication-efficient protocol in this model should have sublinear
multicast complexity. Note that this requirement implies that only a sublinear (in n) number of players can
speak during the protocol except with negligible (in κ) probability.
Since our protocols are motivated by these large-scale peer-to-peer networks, we design our protocols
to be multicast-based and state results with multicast complexity.
Theorem 2 (Communication-efficient BA for synchronous networks). Under standard cryptographic hard-
ness assumptions (more precisely, standard bilinear group assumptions) and assuming the existence of a PKI,
for any constant ǫ > 0, there exists a synchronous BA protocol with multicast complexity poly log(κ) · χ
where n is the number of players, κ is the security parameter, and χ is a cryptographic security parameter3;
the protocol tolerates f < (1 − ǫ)n/2 adaptively corrupted players, and only requires an expected O(1)
number of rounds.
1With synchrony and PKI, the agreement version of BA (where everyone receives input) can tolerate up to minority corruption;
but this bound seems to be in folklore. A related version often called Byzantine Broadcast can tolerate up to n − 1 corruptions
assuming PKI [13].
2The erasure assumption may be replaced with other assumptions, e.g., the adversary does not see messages until the end of the
round, or that, after corrupting a node, the adversary can start sending messages on its behalf only in the next round.
3χ would be of poly log(κ) bits in length if we assumed subexponential security of the cryptographic primitives employed.
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Main result 3: on the necessasity of the PKI. In light of the above Theorem 2, we additionally investi-
gate whether the remaining PKI assumption is necessary. We show that if one insists on a multicast-based
protocol, indeed this assumption (or some form of setup assumption) is necessary for achieving sublinear
multicast complexity. Specifically, we show that without any setup assumption, i.e., under the plain authen-
ticated channels model, no (possibly randomized) BA protocol with C multicast communication complexity
can tolerate more than C weakly adaptive corruptions.
Theorem 3 (Impossibility of sublinear multicast BA without setup assumptions). In a plain authenticated
channels model without a PKI, no protocol with C(κ, n) multicast complexity can achieve BA under C(κ, n)
adaptive corruptions, assuming that the total number of nodes n = poly(κ) is a sufficiently large polynomial.
Further, the lower bound holds even assuming fully synchronous communication, the existence of a random
oracle or a common reference string, and even in the memory-erasure model.
Summarizing our lower-bound and upper-bound results above, we believe that our work makes a signifi-
cant step forward in understanding what minimal assumptions might be necessary in achieving subquadratic-
communication BA.
1.1 Terminology, Disambuiguation, and Additional Related Work
Protocol execution model. Throughout the paper, we assume that protocols execute in a standard Interactive
Turing Machine (ITM) model, where honest nodes receive inputs from an environment denoted Z(1κ) and
sends their outputs to Z as well. An adversary A(1κ) may observe what messages honest nodes want to
send in a round, and then adaptively corrupt nodes during this round. Although the adversary cannot erase a
message that was already sent in this round before a node i became corrupt in the same round, it can make
i send additional messages in this round once i is corrupt. A and Z can communicate arbitrarily at any
time during the execution. All corrupt nodes are under the control of A, i.e., A can decide what messages
they should send. We assume that A and Z are non-uniform, probabilistic polynomial-time (p.p.t.) Turing
Machines and the protocol definition (i.e., honest nodes) can also be probabilistic. Throughout the paper,
we would like all but a negligible in κ fraction of executions to satisfy the desired security properties. We
defer a more formal description of the execution model to Appendix A.1.
Agreement vs. Broadcast. Byzantine Agreement is typically studied in two forms (see Appendix A for
formal definitions):
• Agreement version: every node receives an input bit, and they seek to reach consensus on a bit such
that such that except with negligible probability, if all honest nodes receive the same input bit b, then all
honest nodes must output b too.
• Broadcast version (also called Byzantine Broadcast): a designated sender aims to propagate a bit to all
other nodes; such that except with negligible probability, all honest nodes must output the same bit; and
moreover if the designated sender is forever-honest (i.e., honest throughout the protocol’s execution), any
honest output must be equal to the sender’s input bit.
Under the honest-majority assumption, the two notions are equivalent from a feasibility perspective, i.e.,
we can construct one from the other (but possibly incur polynomial blowup in communication complexity).
Moreover, at least one direction of the reduction preserves communication efficiency. Specifically, given
an adaptively secure BA protocol (agreement version), one can construct an adaptively secure Byzantine
Broadcast protocol by first having the designated sender multicasting its input to everyone, and then having
everyone invoke the BA instance. In this way, if the BA scheme is communication efficient, so is the
resulting Byzantine Broadcast scheme. For this reason, we state all our upper bounds for BA and state all
our lower bounds for Byzantine Broadcast — this makes our upper- and lower-bounds both stronger.
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Additional related works. A line of works in the literature [10, 16, 20] have focused on a simulation-based
notion of adaptive security for Byzantine Broadcast, where the concern is that the adversary should not be
able to observe what the sender wants to broadcast, and then adaptively corrupt the sender to flip the bit.
This notion is stronger than what we consider specifically in the case of Byzantine Broadcast, but such a
strong notion was only achieved earlier by making stronger assumptions than in our paper [16], i.e., the
“atomic message” model: after adaptively corrupting a node i, the adversary not only is unable to erase a
message i already sent in this round, but also must wait for at least one maximum network delay before the
corrupt i can start sending corrupt messages.
2 Lower Bound on Communication Against a Strongly Adaptive Adversary
In this section, we prove that any (possibly randomized) BA protocol must in expectation incur at least
Ω(f2) communication in the presence of a strongly adaptive adversary capable of performing after-the-fact
removal. For the reasons mentioned in Section 1.1, we prove our lower bound for Byzantine Broadcast
(which immediately applies to BA). Our proof strategy builds on and extends the classic Dolev and Reis-
chuk [12, Theorem 2] lower bound, which shows that in every deterministic Byzantine Broadcast protocol
honest nodes need to send at least Ω(f2) messages.
Warmup: the Dolev-Reischuk lower bound. We first explain the Dolev-Reischuk proof at a high level.
Observe that for a deterministic protocol, an execution is completely determined by the input (of the desig-
nated sender) and the adversary’s strategy. Consider the following adversary A: A corrupts a set V of f/2
nodes that does not include the designated sender. Let U denote the set of remaining nodes. All parties in
V behave like honest nodes, except that (i) they ignore the first f/2 messages sent to them, and (ii) they do
not send messages to each other. Suppose the honest designated sender has input 0. For validity to hold, all
honest nodes must output 0.
If at most (f/2)2 messages are sent to V in the above execution, then there exists a node p ∈ V such
that p receives at most f/2 messages. Let S(p) denote the set of nodes that send messages to p. Clearly,
|S(p)| ≤ f/2. We define another adversary A′ almost identically as A except that: (i) A′ does not corrupt
p, (ii) A′ corrupts all nodes in S(p) (possibly including the designated sender), prevents them from sending
any messages to p, but behave honestly to other nodes. Since |S(p)| ≤ f/2, A′ corrupts at most f nodes.
Observe that honest nodes in U\S(p) receive identical messages from all other nodes in the two execu-
tions. Thus, U\S(p) would still output 0 under A′. However, p does not receive any message but has to
output some value. If this value is 1, consistency is violated. If p outputs 0 when receiving no messages,
we can let the sender send 1 under A and derive a consistency violation under A′ following a symmetric
argument.
Our lower bound. We now extend the above proof to randomized protocols. In a randomized protocol,
there are two sources of randomness that need to be considered carefully. On one hand, honest nodes can use
randomization to their advantage. On the other hand, an adaptive adversary can also leverage randomness.
Indeed our lower bound uses a randomized adversarial strategy. In addition, our lower bound crucially relies
on the adversary being strongly adaptive – the adversary can observe that a message is sent by an honest
node h to any other party in a given round r, decide to adaptively corrupt h, and then remove messages sent
by h in round r. We prove the following theorem — here we say that a protocol solves Byzantine Broadcast
with probability q iff for any non-uniform p.p.t. strongly adaptive adversary, with probability q, every honest
node outputs a bit at the end of the protocol, and moreover, consistency and validity are satisfied.
Theorem 4. If a protocol solves Byzantine Broadcast with 12 + ǫ −
1
poly(n) probability against a strongly
adaptive adversary, then in expectation, honest nodes collectively need to send at least (ǫf/2)2 messages.
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Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that a protocol solves Byzantine Broadcast against a strongly
adaptive adversary with less than ǫ probability of error using less than (ǫf/2)2 expected messages.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the protocol only violates safety and validity but never
violates termination. If this is not the case, i.e., if honest nodes sometimes do not output after poly(n) rounds,
we can simply make them output 1. The probability of error of the resulting new protocol is no larger by
more than 1
poly(n) than that of the original one because we simply converted all instances of termination
violations into safety or validity violations.
Now, in an always-terminating protocol, without loss of generality, assume that there exist ⌈n/2⌉ nodes
that output 1 with at least 1/2 probability if they receive no messages. (Otherwise, then there must exist
⌈n/2⌉ nodes that output 0 with at least 1/2 probability if they receive no messages, and the entire proof
follows from a symmetric argument.) Let V be a set of f/2 such nodes not containing the designated sender.
We can always find such a V because f/2 < ⌈n/2⌉. Let U denote the remaining nodes. In the rest of proof,
let the designated sender send 0.
Next, consider the following adversary A (same as Dolev-Reischuk):
1. Corrupt V .
2. Each party in V behaves like an honest node, except that it ignores the first f/2 messages sent to it
and does not send messages to other nodes in V .
For a protocol to have an expected message complexity of (ǫf/2)2, honest nodes collectively need to
send fewer than that many messages in expectation regardless of the adversary’s strategy. Let z be a random
variable denoting the number of messages sent by honest nodes to V . We have E[z] < (ǫf/2)2. Let X be
the event that z < ǫ(f/2)2. By Markov’s inequality, Pr[z ≥ 1ǫE[z]] ≤ ǫ. Thus, Pr[z < ǫ(f/2)
2] ≥ Pr[z <
1
ǫE[z]] > 1− ǫ.
Let Y be the event that among the first ǫ(f/2)2 messages, a node p picked uniformly at random by the
adversary receives at most f/2 messages. Observe that among the first ǫ(f/2)2 = ǫ|V |(f/2) messages,
there exist at most ǫ|V | nodes that receive more than f/2 of those. Since p has been picked uniformly at
random from V , Pr[Y ] ≥ 1− ǫ. Thus we have that
Pr[X ∩ Y ] = Pr[X] + Pr[Y ]− Pr[X ∪ Y ] > (1− ǫ) + (1− ǫ)− 1 = 1− 2ǫ
Now, define another adversary A′ almost identically as A except:
1. The adversary A′ picks a node p ∈ V uniformly at random; it corrupts everyone else in V except p.
2. Whenever some node s ∈ U attempts to send a message to p in a round, if A′ has corrupted fewer
than f nodes so far, it immediately corrupts s and removes the message sent by s to p in that round.
Once corrupted, s does not send p any messages but otherwise behaves correctly.
Observe that X ∩ Y denotes the event where the total number of messages sent by honest nodes to V
is less than ǫ(f/2)2 and among those p has received at most f/2 messages. Let S(p) be the set of nodes
that attempt to send p messages (some or all of these attempts are blocked). Thus, we have shown that,
Pr[S(p) ≤ f/2] ≥ 1 − 2ǫ. This is the probability that the random node p picked by the adversary A
receives ≤ f/2 messages, which also means p receives no message at all under the adversary A′. Thus, p
outputs 1 with at least 1/2 probability under A′ by the definition of V . Meanwhile, honest nodes in U\S(p)
receive identical messages under the two adversarial strategies A and A′, and they need to output 0 under
A to preserve validity. Thus, with Pr[X ∩ Y ] > 12(1 − 2ǫ) =
1
2 − ǫ probability, either validity is violated
under A or consistency is violated under A′.
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3 Synchronous BA with Subquadratic Communication Complexity
In this section, we present our synchronous BA protocol that achieves sublinear multicast complexity. For
ease of exposition, in the main body we opt for simplicity: we explain a simple protocol that tolerates only
1
3 − ǫ fraction of adaptive corruptions, and completes in ω(log κ) rounds. In the appendices, we will show
how to improve the resilience to 12 − ǫ.
3.1 Warmup: A Simple, Communication-Inefficient BA Tolerating 1
3
Corruptions
We first describe an extremely simple, communication-inefficient synchronous BA protocol (inspired by the
Phase-King paradigm [2]) that tolerates less than 13 corruptions. For a synchronous network, multicast by
honest nodes will be received by honest nodes at the beginning of the next round.
The protocol proceeds in epochs r = 0, 1, . . . R − 1 where R is a super-logarithmic function in κ, and
every epoch consists of O(1) synchronous rounds. For the time being, assume a random leader election
oracle that elects and announces a random leader at the beginning of every epoch. At initialization, every
node i sets bi to its input bit, and sets its “sticky flag” F = 1 (think of the sticky flag as indicating whether
to “stick” to the bit in the previous epoch). Each epoch r now proceeds as follows where all messages are
signed, and only messages with valid signatures are processed:
1. The leader of epoch r (i.e., node r) flips a random coin b and multicasts (propose, r, b).
2. Every node i sets b∗i := bi if F = 1 or if it has not heard a valid proposal from the current epoch’s leader
4.
Else, it sets b∗i := b where b is the proposal heard from the current epoch’s leader (if proposals for both
b = 0 and b = 1 have been observed, choose an arbitrary bit).
Then, node i multicasts (ACK, r, b∗i ).
3. If at least 2n3 number of ACKs from distinct nodes have been received and vouch for the same b
∗, set
bi := b
∗ and F := 1; else set F := 0.
At the end of R = ω(log κ) epochs, each node outputs the bit that it last sent an ACK for (and 0 if if never
sent an ACK message).
Basically, in every epoch, every node either switches to the leader’s proposal (if any has been observed)
or it sticks to its previous “belief” bi. This simple protocol works because of the following observations.
Henceforth, we refer to a collection of at least 2n3 number of ACKs from distinct nodes for the same epoch
and the same b as ample ACKs for b.
• Consistency within an epoch. Suppose that in epoch r, honest node i observes ample ACKs for b from
a set of nodes denoted S, and honest node j observes ample ACKs for b′ from the set S′. By a standard
quorum intersection argument, S ∩S′ must contain at least one forever-honest node. Since honest nodes
vote uniquely, it must be that b = b′.
• A good epoch exists. Next, suppose that in some epoch r the leader is honest. We say that this leader
chooses a lucky bit b∗ iff either 1) in epoch r − 1, no honest nodes have seen ample ACKs for either bit
and thus all honest nodes will switch to the leader’s proposal in epoch r; or 2) in epoch r−1, some honest
nodes have seen ample ACKs for a unique bit b∗ (which agrees with the current leader’s random choice).
Clearly, an honest leader chooses a lucky b∗ with probability at least 1/2; and except with exp(Ω(−R))
probability, an honest-leader epoch with a lucky choice must exist.
• Persistence of honest choice after a good epoch. Now, as soon as we reach an epoch (denoted r) with
an honest leader and its choice of bit b∗ is lucky, then all honest nodes will ACK b∗ in epoch r. Thus
4We stress that since honest nodes’ sticky bit is set to 1 initially, in the first epoch every honest node votes on its input bit. This
matters to the validity of the protocol.
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all honest nodes will hear ample ACKs for b∗ in epoch r; therefore, they will all stick to ACKing b∗ in
epoch r + 1. By induction, in all future epochs they will stick to ACKing b∗.
• Validity. If all honest nodes receive the same bit b∗ as input then due to the same argument as above the
bit b∗ will always stick around in all epochs.
3.2 Communication Efficiency through Vote-Specific Eligibility
The above simple protocol requires in expectation linear number of multicast messages (in each round every
node multicasts a message). We now consider how to improve the multicast complexity of the warmup
protocol and we will remove the idealized leader election oracle in the process too.
Background on VRFs. We rely on a verifiable random function (VRF) [26]. A trusted setup phase is
used to generate a public-key infrastructure (PKI): each node i ∈ [n] obtains a VRF secret key ski, and its
corresponding public key pki. Recall that a VRF evaluation on the message µ denoted (ρ, π) ← VRFski(µ)
generates a pseudorandom value ρ and a proof π such that ρ is computationally indistinguishable from
random without the secret key ski, and with pki everyone can verify from the proof π that ρ is evaluated
correctly.
Strawman: the Chen-Micali approach. We first describe the paradigm of Chen and Micali [9] but we
explain it in the context of our warmup protocol. Imagine that now not everyone is required to vote in
a round r. Instead, we use the function VRF1ski(ACK, r) < D to determine whether i is eligible to vote
in round r where VRF1 denote the first output of the VRF, and D is a difficulty parameter appropriately
chosen such that in expectation, λ := ω(log κ) many nodes would be chosen to vote in each round. When
node i sends an ACK message, it attaches the VRF’s evaluation outcome as well as the proof such that every
node can verify its eligibility using its public key pki. Correspondingly, when we tally votes, the original
threshold 2n/3 should be changed to 2λ/3, i.e, super-majority of the expected committee size.
Evaluating the VRF requires knowing the node’s secret key. Thus, only the player itself knows at what
rounds it is eligible to vote. This may seem to solve the problem because the adversary cannot predict
in advance who will be sending messages in every round The problem with this is that once an adaptive
adversary A notices that some player i was eligible to vote for b in round r (because i just sent a valid vote
for b), A can corrupt i immediately and make i vote for 1− b in the same round!
To tackle this precise issue, Chen and Micali [9] relies on the memory-erasure model (referred to as
ephemeral keys in their paper): the players employ a forward-secure signing scheme5, and erase its round-
specific secret-key immediately after casting the vote, such that even if the attacker instantly corrupts this
node, it cannot cast another vote in the same round.
Our key insight: bit-specific eligibility. Our key insight is to make the eligibility bit-specific. To elaborate,
the committee eligible to vote for b in round r is chosen independently from the committee eligible to vote
on 1 − b in the same round. Concretely, node i is eligible to send an ACK message for the bit b ∈ {0, 1} in
round r iff VRF1ski(ACK, r, b) < D, where D is the aforementioned difficulty parameter.
What does this achieve? Suppose that the attacker sees some node i votes for the bit b in round r.
Although the attacker can now immediately corrupt i, the fact that i was allowed to vote for b in round r
does not make i any more likely to be eligible to vote for 1 − b in the same round. Thus, corrupting i is no
more useful to the adversary than corrupting any other node.
Finally, since we already make use of the VRF, as a by-product we can remove the idealized leader elec-
tion oracle in the warmup protocol: a node i is eligible for making a proposal in iteration r iffVRF1ski(propose, r, b) <
5Informally, in a forward secure signing scheme, in the beginning the node has a key that can sign any slot numbered 0 or higher;
after signing a message for slot t, the node can update its key to one that can henceforth sign only slots t+ 1 or higher, and the old
key is erased.
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D0 where D0 is a separate difficult parameter explained below, and the node attaches the VRF evaluation
outcome and proof with any proposal it makes so others can verify its eligibility.
Difficulty parameters. The two difficulty parameters D andD0 need to be specified differently. Recall that
D is used to elect a committee in each round for sending ACK messages; and D0 is used for leader election.
1. D should be set such that each committee is λ = ω(log κ)-sized in expectation6 ; whereas
2. D0 should be set such that every proposal has a 1/2n probability to be eligible.
Putting it altogether. More formally, we use the phrase “node i conditionally multicasts a message (T, r, b)”
to mean that node i checks if it is eligible to vote for b in epoch r and if so, it multicasts (T, r, b, i, π), where
π is a proof proving that i indeed is eligible (π includes the pseudorandom evaluation result and the proof
that is output by the VRF). Here T ∈ {propose, ACK} stands for the type of the message.
Now, our new subset-sampling based protocol is almost identical to simple protocol with large multicast
complexity except for the following changes:
• every occurrence of multicast is now replaced with “conditionally multicast”;
• the threshold number of ACKs for a bit to stick is now replaced with 2λ3 ; and
• upon receiving every message, a node checks the proof to verify the message’s validity (whereas in the
earlier protocol nodes only checks signatures).
Subtleties in cryptographic reasoning and deferred technical details. Most previously known VRF
constructions [4, 18, 26] do not provide security under an adaptive adversary7. Chen and Micali [9] use
random oracles (RO) and unique signatures to construct an adaptively secure VRF but our goal is to remove
the RO. In the appendices, we will show how to instantiate an appropriate VRF with adaptive security. The
proof for this part is actually rather technical and subtle, but in the interest of space we have to defer it to
the appendices.
3.3 Proof Sketch
We call an attempt for node i to check eligibility to send either a propose or ACK message a mining attempt
for a propose or ACK message (inspired by Bitcoin’s terminology where miners “mine” blocks).
We now explain why our new protocol works, by following similar arguments as the underlying BA —
but now we must additionally analyze the stochastic process induced by eligibility election.
To help our analysis, we shall abstract away the cryptography needed for eligibility election, and instead
think of eligibility election as making “mining” queries with a trusted party called Fmine. Specifically, if
a node i wants to check its eligibility for (T, r, b) where T ∈ {propose, ACK}, it calls Fmine.mine(T, r, b),
and Fmine shall flip a random coin with appropriate probability to determine whether this “mining” attempt
is successful. If successful, Fmine.verify((T, r, b), i) can vouch to any node of the successful attempt
(imagine that this is used in place of verifying the VRF proof). We now analyze this stochastic process.
• Consistency within an epoch. We first argue why “consistency within an epoch” still holds with the new
scheme. Henceforth, if a node makes a mining attempt for some (T, r, b) while still being honest, this is
called an honest mining attempt (even if the node immediately becomes corrupt afterwards in the same
round). Else, if an already corrupt node makes a mining attempt, it is called a corrupt mining attempt.
There are at most (13 − ǫ)n corrupt nodes, each of which might try to mine for 2 ACKs (one for each
bit) in some fixed epoch r. On the other hand, each so-far-honest node will try to mine for only 1 ACK
6Since we are interested in how communication scales w.r.t. n; we may assume without loss of generality that n ≥ 2λ.
7In this paper, adaptive security for VRF means security under selective opening of corrupt nodes’ secret keys. This is a different
notion of adaptivity than in some prior works [4, 18].
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in each epoch. Therefore, in epoch r, the total number of (honest or corrupt) mining attempts is at most
(13 − ǫ)n · 2 + (
2
3 + ǫ)n · 1 = (
4
3 − ǫ)n, each of which is independently successful with probability
λ
n .
Hence, if there are 2λ3 ACKs for each of the bits 0 and 1, this means there are at least in total
4λ
3 successful
mining attempts, which happens with negligible probability, by the Chernoff Bound. Therefore, except
with negligible probability, if any node sees 2λ3 ACKs for some bit b, then no other node sees
2λ
3 ACKs
for a different bit b′.
Remark. It is important that the eligibility election be tied to the bit being proposed/ACKed. Had it not
been the case, the adversary could observe whenever an honest node sends (ACK, r, b), and immediately
corrupt the node in the same round and make it send (ACK, r, 1 − b) too. In this case, clearly if there
are 2λ3 ACKs for b in epoch r, then by corrupting all these nodes that sent the ACKs, the adversary can
construct 2λ3 ACKs for 1− b, and thus “consistency within an epoch” does not hold.
• A good epoch exists. We now argue why “a good epoch exists” in our new scheme. Here, for an epoch
r to be good, the following must hold: 1) a single so-far-honest node successfully mines a propose
message, and no already corrupt node successfully mines a propose message8; and 2) if some honest
nodes want to stick to a (unique) belief b∗ in epoch r, the leader’s random coin must agree with b∗. Note
that every so-far-honest node makes only one proposemining attempt per epoch. Every already corrupt
node can make two propose mining attempts in an epoch, one for each bit. Regardless, recall that
our propose mining difficulty parameter is set such that on average one node is elected leader every 2
epochs (in an honest execution) — this implies that in every epoch, withΘ(1) probability, a single honest
propose mining attempt is successful and no corrupt propose mining attempt is successful. Since our
protocol consists of λ = ω(log κ) epochs, a good epoch exists except with negligible in κ probability.
• Persistence of honest choice after a good epoch and validity. Finally, the remainder of the proof, includ-
ing “persistence of honest choice after a good epoch” and “validity” hold in a relatively straightforward
fashion by applying the standard Chernoff bound.
4 On The Neccessity of Setup Assumptions: Informal Overview
We show that some form of setup assumption is needed for multicast-based subquadratic BA. Specifically,
in the plain authenticated channels model without any setup assumptions, we show the impossibility of
sublinear multicast-complexity BA. Our proof is inspired by the classical techniques for proving consensus
lower bounds in the authenticated channels model [15, 24, 25]; however, we extend known techniques in
novel and non-trivial manners, particularly in the way we rely on the ability to make adaptive corruptions
to complete the proof. We provide an informal overview of our lower bound proof below (for Theorem 3)
while deferring the formal description to Appendix B. As mentioned in Section 1.1, we consider Byzantine
Broadcast in proving our lower bound which makes our lower bound stronger (and immediately implies the
same lower bound for BA).
Suppose that some protocol achieves adaptive security and sublinear multicast complexity. We describe
a hypothetical experiment: consider two honest executions that share a single node (that is not the designated
sender): (input: 0) Q --- 1 --- Q’ (input: 1). The set Q contains nodes numbered 2, . . . , n,
and so does the set Q′. The node 1 is shared across the two executions. Whenever a node in Q (or Q′ resp.)
sends a message, all nodes in Q (or Q′ resp.) and the node 1 receives the message. Whenever 1 wants to
send a message, it sends it to nodes in both Q and Q′. If 1 receives a message from either i ∈ Q or i ∈ Q′,
it acts as if the message is received from i. We assume that 2 ∈ Q and 2 ∈ Q′ are the senders respectively
in the two executions, and that they receive the inputs 0 and 1 respectively.
8If in some epoch multiple honest nodes mine a propose message, we can just think of this epoch as having a corrupt proposer.
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We now interpret this hypothetical experiment in two ways. First, it could be that 1 is the malicious
node simulating all of Q′ andQ is honest. Alternatively, it could be that there are only nodes 1 to n, initially
all honest, and the nodes in Q′ are imaginary and entirely simulated by the adversary in its head. Whenever
some node in Q′ wants to speak, the corresponding one in Q is adaptively corrupt to implement this action
— it is not difficult to see that the adversary needs to corrupt only sublinear number of nodes. By the validity
requirement in the former interpretation (where 1 is corrupt), we conclude that nodes in Q must output 0
and nodes in Q′ must output 1 by symmetry. Now, consider the latter interpretation (where 1 is honest), we
may conclude that the node 1 must be consistent with nodes in Q; and by symmetry 1 must be consistent
with nodes in Q′ too. This allows us to reach a contradiction and rule out the existence of such a protocol.
We stress that it is important that we use only the consistency property in reasoning for the latter inter-
pretation since the sender may be corrupt in the latter interpretation. The formal proof will be presented in
Appendix B.
Summary of Deferred Materials in Appendices
We give an overview of the additional results and formal proofs contained in the appendices.
1. We show how to improve the resilience of our synchronous protocol to tolerate (nearly) minority
corruptions and formal proofs in Appendix C.
2. For ease of exposition, in our appendices we first describe our protocols assuming an Fmine ideal
functionality. We formally describe how to remove this ideal oracle using appropriate, adaptively
secure cryptographic building blocks in Appendix D, and present the computational reduction proofs
in Appendix E.
3. We formally present a detailed proof for Theorem 3 in Appendix B.
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A Preliminaries
A.1 Model of Protocol Execution
We assume a standard protocol execution model with n parties (also called nodes) numbered 0, 1, . . . , n−1.
An external party called the environment and denoted Z provides inputs to honest nodes and receives outputs
from the honest nodes. An adversary denoted A can adaptively corrupt nodes any time during the execution.
All nodes that have been corrupt are under the control of A, i.e., the messages they receive are forwarded
to A, and A controls what messages they will send once they become corrupt. The adversary A and the
environment Z are allowed to freely exchange messages any time during the execution. Henceforth, at any
time in the protocol, nodes that remain honest so far are referred to as so-far-honest nodes; nodes that remain
honest till the end of the protocol are referred to as forever-honest nodes; nodes that become corrupt before
the end of the protocol are referred to as eventually-corrupt nodes. Henceforth, we assume that all parties as
well asA and Z are Interactive Turing Machines, and the execution is parametrized by a security parameter
κ that is common knowledge to all parties as well as A and Z .
Communication model. We assume that the execution proceeds in rounds. We assume a synchronous
network, i.e., every message sent by an so-far-honest node is guaranteed to be received by an honest recipient
at the beginning of the next round.
All of our protocols will be in the multicast model: honest nodes participate in the protocol by multicas-
ting messages to each other. We assume that when a so-far-honest node i multicasts a message M , it can
immediately become corrupt in the same round and made to send one or more messages in the same round.
However, the message M that was already multicast before i became corrupt cannot be retracted — in a
synchronous model, all other so-far-honest nodes will receive the message M at the beginning of the next
round.
Notational conventions. Since all parties, including the adversary A and the environment Z are assumed
to be non-uniform probabilitic polynomial-time (p.p.t.) Interactive Turing Machines (ITMs), protocol execu-
tion is assumed to be probabilistic in nature. We would like to ensure that certain security properties such as
consistency and liveness hold for almost all execution traces, assuming that both A and Z are polynomially
bounded.
Henceforth in the paper, we use the notation view ← EXECΠ(A,Z, κ) to denote a sample of the
randomized execution of the protocol Π with A and Z , and security parameter κ ∈ N. The randomness in
the experiment comes from honest nodes’ randomness, A, and Z , and view is sometimes also referred to
as an execution trace or a sample path. We would like that the fraction of sample paths that fail to satisfy
relevant security properties be negligibly small in the security parameter κ.
More formally, let P be a polynomial-time computable predicate defined over a view that checks
whether certain security properties hold for a view. Whenever we say “except for a negligible fraction
of the views, P (view) = 1” or “except with negligible probability over the choice of view, P (view) = 1”,
we technically mean the following:
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For any p.p.t. (A,Z) (possibly required to respect a certain corruption budget), there exists a negligible
function negl(·), such that
Pr
[
view ← EXECΠ(A,Z, κ) : P (view) = 1
]
≥ 1− negl(κ)
In particular, a function negl(·) is said to be negligible if for every polynomial p(·), there exists some κ0
such that negl(κ) ≤ 1p(κ) for every κ ≥ κ0.
Definition 5 ((n, α)-respecting). We say that (A,Z) is (n, α)-respecting with respect to some protocol Π iff
for every view in the support of EXEC
Π(A,Z, κ), (A,Z) spawns n nodes among which at most α fraction
can be adaptively corrupt.
Multicast complexity. We now formally define the notion of classical communication complexity and
multicast complexity.
Definition 6 (Classical communication complexity). Suppose that Π is a protocol expressed in the pairwise-
channels model. We say that Π has communication complexity C(κ, n) w.r.t. (A,Z), iff except with negligi-
ble probability over the choice of view sampled from EXECΠ(A,Z, κ), the total number of bits exchanged
by pairs of honest nodes is bounded by C(κ, n).
Definition 7 (Multicast complexity). Suppose that Π is a protocol in the multicast model. We say that Π
has multicast complexity C(κ, n) w.r.t. (A,Z), iff except with negligible probability over the choice of view
sampled from EXECΠ(A,Z, κ), the total number of bits multicast by honest nodes is bounded by C(κ, n).
A.2 Formal Definitions for Byzantine Agreement
We formally define two versions of the problem, a broadcast version where only a designated sender has an
input; and an agreement version where all nodes have input.
A.2.1 Broadcast Version
In a Byzantine broadcast protocol, there is a designated sender (or simply sender) that is part of the common
knowledge. We use the convention that node 0 is the sender.
Syntax. Prior to protocol start, the sender receives an input b ∈ {0, 1} from the environment Z . At the end
of the protocol, every node i (including the sender) outputs a bit bi to the environment Z .
Security definition. AByzantine broadcast protocolΠmust satisfy consistency, validity, and Tend-termination.
Specifically, let Tend := poly(κ, n) be a polynomial in κ and n, we say that the protocol Π satisfies consis-
tency, validity, and Tend-termination with respect to (A,Z) iff there exists a negligible function negl(·) such
that for every κ, except with negl(κ) probability over the choice of view←$EXEC
Π(A,Z, κ), the following
properties hold:
• Consistency. If a forever-honest node outputs bi and another forever-honest node outputs bj to Z , then it
must hold that bi = bj .
• Validity. If the sender is forever-honest and the sender’s input is b from Z , then all forever-honest nodes
must output b to Z .
• Tend-termination. By the end of round Tend(κ, n), all forever-honest nodes output a bit.
We say that a Byzantine broadcast Π satisfies consistency, validity, and Tend-termination in (n, α)-
environments, iff for every p.p.t. (A,Z) that is (n, α)-respecting with respect to Π, Π satisfies consistency,
validity, or Tend-termination with respect to (A,Z).
14
A.2.2 Agreement Version
An agreement protocol9 does not have a designated sender. Intead, every honest node receives an input bit
from the environment Z . Validity is required only if all honest nodes receive the same input bit b— in this
case, honest nodes’ ouput is required to match this bit. We provide formal definitions below.
Syntax. Prior to protocol start, every node i receives an input bi ∈ {0, 1} from the environment Z . At the
end of the protocol, every node i (including the sender) outputs a bit b′i to the environment Z .
Security definition. An agreement protocol Π must satisfy consistency, validity, and Tend-termination.
Specifically, let Tend := poly(κ, n) be a polynomial in κ and n, we say that the protocol Π satisfies consis-
tency, validity, and Tend-termination with respect to (A,Z) iff there exists a negligible function negl(·) such
that for every κ, except with negl(κ) probability over the choice of view←$EXEC
Π(A,Z, κ), the following
properties hold:
• Consistency. If a forever-honest node outputs bi and another forever-honest node outputs bj to Z , then it
must hold that bi = bj .
• Validity. If all forever-honest nodes receive the same input bit b from Z , then all forever-honest nodes
must output b to Z .
• Tend-termination. By the end of round Tend(κ, n), all forever-honest nodes output a bit.
We say that an agreement protocol Π satisfies consistency, validity, and Tend-termination in (n, α)-
environments, iff for every p.p.t. (A,Z) that is (n, α)-respecting with respect to Π, Π satisfies consistency,
validity, or Tend-termination with respect to (A,Z).
A.3 Ideal Mining Functionality Fmine
Earlier in Section 3.2, we described how to leverage cryptographic building blocks such as PRFs and NIZKs
to realize committee/leader election (or eligibility election). For all our protocols, it would be convenient
to describe them assuming such eligibility election is a blackbox primitive. We thus introduce an ideal
functionality called Fmine which, informally speaking, captures the cryptographic procedures of random
eligibility selection. One can imagine that Fmine is a trusted party such that whenever a node attempts to
mine a ticket for a message type m, Fmine flips a random coin with an appropriate probability to decide
if this mining attempt is successful. Fmine stores the results of all previous coin flips, such that if a node
performs another mining attempt for the same m later, the same result will be used.
Henceforth in our paper, we will first describe all of our protocols in an ideal world assuming the
existence of such a trusted party Fmine (also referred to as Fmine-hybrid protocols in the cryptography
literature [5, 6]). Later in Appendix D, we will show that using the cryptographic techniques described in
Section 3.2, all of our Fmine-hybrid protocols can be instantiated in a real world where Fmine does not exist.
Fmine ideal functionality. As shown in Figure 1, the Fmine ideal functionality has two activation points:
• Whenever a node i calls mine(m) for the first time, Fmine flips a random coin to decide if node i has
successfully mined a ticket for m.
• If node i has called mine(m) and the attempt is successful, anyone can then call verify(m, i) to ascertain
that indeed i has mined a ticket for m.
This Fmine functionality is secret since if an so-far-honest node i has not attempted to mine a ticket for m,
then no corrupt node can learn whether i is in the committee corresponding to m.
9Agreement is also commonly referred to as “consensus” in the distributed systems literature.
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Fmine(1
κ,P)
The function P : {0, 1}∗ → [0, 1] maps each message to some success probability.
• On receive mine(m) from node i for the first time: let Coin[m, i] := Bernoulli(P(m)) and return
Coin[m, i].
• On receive verify(m, i): if mine(m) has been called by node i, return Coin[m, i]; else return 0.
Figure 1: The mining ideal functionality Fmine.
B Setup Assumptions are Necessary for Sublinear Multicast Complexity
In this section, we show that it is impossible to have an adaptively secure Byzantine agreement protocol that
achieves o(n)multicast complexity under an authenticated channels model (i.e., without PKI) — even when
99% of the nodes must remain honest. Our lower bound holds even when assuming the existence of an RO
and in the erasure model.
As mentioned in Section 4, for our lower bound, we consider a broadcast variant of the BA problem.
In the broadcast version of the problem, there is a designated sender who tries to send its input bit to all
players. Consistency requires that (except with negligible probability) all honest nodes output the same bit;
and validity requires that (except with negligible probability) if the sender is forever-honest, all honest nodes
must output the sender’s input bit. As we explained earlier in Section 4, considering the broadcast variant
makes our lower bound stronger.
Model for our lower bound. We consider a model where any message multicast by an honest sender is
delivered to all honest nodes at the beginning of the next round, i.e., ∆ = 1. Further, the message always
carries the true identity of the sender, i.e., the communication channel authenticates the sender.
Proof of Theorem 3. We now prove the impossibility result, i.e., Theorem 3 whose statement was formally
presented in the introduction.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a Byzantine broadcast protocol with C(κ, n)
multicast complexity and tolerating C(κ, n) corruptions; and suppose that n = poly(κ) is a sufficiently
large polynomial. We will prove the impossibility by considering a hypothetical experiment where a set
of 2n − 1 nodes, connected in specific ways, execute the honest protocol. We argue that this hypothetical
experiment can be interpreted in two different ways; and relying on the security properties of BA, we reach
a contradiction by reasoning about the two interpretations.
A hypothetical experiment. Consider a hypothetical experiment depicted in the following graph:
(input: 0) Q --- 1 --- Q’ (input: 1)
More specifically, imagine that the node 1 simultaneously participates in two executions of the protocol:
on the left the node 1 plays with the set Q, containing nodes numbered 2, 3, . . . , n; on the right, the node
1 plays with the set Q′, containing nodes also numbered 2, 3, . . . , n. Suppose that node 2 ∈ Q and node
2 ∈ Q′ are the two senders; further 2 ∈ Q receives the input 0 and 2 ∈ Q′ receives the input 1. All nodes in
Q ∪ {1} ∪Q′ execute the honest protocol where messages are forwarded as below:
• whenever node 1 multicasts a message, the same message is delivered to nodes in both Q and Q′;
• whenever any node i ∈ {2, . . . , n} from Q multicasts a message, it is delivered to all nodes in Q as
well as the node 1;
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• whenever any node i ∈ {2, . . . , n} from Q′ multicasts a message, it is delivered to all nodes in Q′ as
well as the node 1.
Note that node 1 treats a message from i ∈ Q and i ∈ Q′ identically, i.e., the message has the sender
identity i for some i ∈ {2, . . . , n} no matter whether i comes from Q or Q′.
To summarize the above defines a hypothetical experiment containing 2n − 1 nodes all executing the
honest protocol and where protocol messages are routed in specific ways. We now interpret this hypothetical
experiment in two different manners, leading to a contradiction.
Corrupt-1 interpretation: First, the hypothetical experiment can be viewed as an execution among n nodes
numbered 1, 2, . . . , n, where the node 1 is (statically) corrupt. Specifically, imagine that the setQ′ represents
the honest nodes numbered 2, 3, . . . , n; and imagine that the corrupt node 1 is simulating all nodes in Q in
its head. In this case, by the definition of multicast complexity, we immediately conclude the following
where we use the random variable view to denote a random sample of the hypothetical experiment:
Claim 8. Except with negligible probability over the choice of view of the hypothetical experiment, nodes
in Q′ cannot send more than C(κ, n) bits of distinct messages. By symmetry, we also have that except with
negligible probability over the choice of view of the merged execution, nodes in Q cannot send more than
C(κ, n) bits of distinct messages.
Now, by the validity requirement of Byzantine broadcast, we have the following:
Claim 9. Except with negligible probability over the choice of view of the hypothetical experiment, all
nodes in Q′ output 1. By symmetry, we also have that except with negligible probability over the choice of
view of the merged execution, all nodes in Q output 0.
Now, it is interesting to consider what node 1 should output in the hypothetical experiment. To answer
this question, we can view the execution in a different light. In comparison with the earlier interpretation,
here the important difference is that now we want to explain the execution assuming 1 is actually honest.
Honest-1 interpretation: Only node 1 and nodes inQ are real and initially honest, andQ′ is imaginary and
simulated by the adversary in its head — initially, at protocol start, the adversary has not corrupted any node
yet. It will make corruption actions along the way.
Note that the adversary can observe all messages sent over the authenticated channel. Based on the
messages received, it simulates the actions of the imaginary nodes inQ′ assuming thatQ′ follows the honest
protocol. Whenever some node j ∈ Q′ wants to speak, the adversary adaptively corrupts the corresponding
node j ∈ Q and implements this action.
Specifically, at the end of each round, the adversary simulates the next round of all nodes in Q′ in its
head, and checks to see which nodes are about to send a message in the next round. The adversary then
corrupts precisely those nodes that are about to send a message (unless they are already corrupt). As a
special case, for the first round of the protocol, the adversary simulates the actions of Q′ in its head prior to
protocol start and corrupts those that are about to send a message in the first round.
Now, say that at the beginning of some round r, some subset S ⊆ Q′ are about to send a message,
and recall that by the attack defined above, S has been corrupt by the adversary in Q. At this moment, the
corrupt nodes S splits themselves into two threads: one thread still follows the honest protocol and sends
whatever message the honest protocol instructs them to send; and the other thread sends whatever message
its simulated copy in Q′ ought to send in this round — but only to node 1 and not to anyone else.
Since the protocol has C(κ, n) multicast complexity, except with negligible probability over the choice
of view, the adversary will corrupt no more than C(κ, n) nodes. Due to Claim 9, the remaining honest
nodes in Q would output 0 except with negligible probability over the choice of view. By the consistency
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requirement of Byzantine broadcast10 , except with negligible probability over the choice of view, node 1
should agree with the remaining honest nodes in Q, i.e., output 0 too.
By symmetry, it could be that the adversary is actually simulating Q and corrupting the corresponding
nodes in Q′ when nodes in Q want to speak. Due to Claim 9 and the consistency requirement, we conclude
that except with negligible probability over the choice of view, node 1 should output 1 (to be consistent with
the honest nodes in Q′. Thus we have a contradiction.
C Synchronous BA with Subquadratic Communication Complexity
In this section, we present our synchronous BA protocol that achieves subquadratic communication complex-
ity — specifically our protocol is multicast-based and completes in sublinear number of multicast messages.
Our starting point is Abraham et al. [1], a synchronous BA protocol, tolerating f < n/2 corruptions, achiev-
ing expected constant round and quadratic communication complexity. We first explain Abraham et al. at a
high level and then present techniques to achieve subquadratic communication complexity.
C.1 Warmup: Synchronous Quadratic BA
Our description below assumes n = 2f+1 nodes in total. The protocol runs in iterations r = 1, 2, · · · . Each
iteration has four synchronous rounds called Status, Propose, Vote, and Commit, respectively. Messages
sent at the beginning of a round will be received before next round. All messages are signed. Henceforth, a
collection of f +1 (signed) iteration-r Votemessages for the same bit b ∈ {0, 1} from distinct nodes is said
to be an iteration-r certificate for b. For the time being, assume a random leader election oracle that elects
a random leader Lr at the beginning of every iteration r.
Below is the protocol for an iteration r ≥ 2. The protocol for the very first iteration r = 1 skips the
Status and Propose rounds.
1. Status. Every node multicasts a Status message of the form (Status, r, b,C) containing the highest
certified bit b it has seen so far as well as the corresponding certificate C.
2. Propose. The leader Lr chooses a bit b with the highest certificate denoted C breaking ties arbitrarily.
To unify the presentation, we say that a bit b without any certificate has an iteration-0 certificate and it
is treated as the lowest ranked certificate. Suppose that the highest certificate C is from iteration r′. The
leader multicasts (Propose, r, b) with C attached.
3. Vote. For the very first iteration r = 1, a node votes for its input bit b by multicasting (Vote, r = 1, b).
For all iterations r > 1, if a validly signed (Propose, r, b) message has been received from Lr with
a certificate C for b, and moreover if the node has not observed a strictly higher certificate for 1 − b, it
multicasts an iteration-r Votemessage for b of the form (Vote, r, b) with the leader’s proposal attached11.
Importantly, if the node has observed a certificate for the opposite bit 1− b from the same iteration as C,
it will vote for b.
4. Commit. If a node has received f + 1 iteration-r signed votes for the same bit b from distinct nodes
(which form an iteration-r certificate C for b) and no iteration-r vote for 1− b, it multicasts an iteration-r
Commit message for b of the form (Commit, r, b) with C attached.
⋆ (This step is not part of the iteration and can be executed at any time.) If a node has received f + 1
Commit messages for the same b from the same iteration from distinct nodes, it multicasts a termination
message of the form (Terminate, b) with the f +1 Commitmessages attached. The node then outputs b
10The sender may have been corrupt by the adversary, thus our argument does not rely on validity here.
11The leader’s proposal will not be included in a Vote message or a certificate.
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and terminates. This last message will make all other nodes multicast Terminate, output b and terminate
in the next round.
Consistency. To argue consistency, we show that if any honest node outputs a bit b in iteration r, then no
certificate for 1− b can be formed in iteration r and all subsequent iterations, assuming ideal signatures.
An honest node outputs b in iteration r, only if it has observed f +1 iteration-r Commitmessages (from
distinct nodes) for b. One of these must have been sent by an honest node henceforth indexed by i∗. For an
iteration-r certificate for 1− b to exist, an honest node must have multicast a vote for 1− b. But in that case,
i∗ would have received this conflicting vote and thus would not have sent the commit message for b. We
have reached a contradiction. Thus, we can rule out any iteration-r certificate for 1− b.
Furthermore, by the end of iteration r, all nodes will receive from node i∗ an iteration-r certificate for
b. The preference for a higher certificate then ensures consistency for all subsequent iterations. Since no
iteration-r certificate for 1 − b exists, no honest node votes for 1 − b in iteration r + 1; hence, no iteration-
(r + 1) certificate for 1− b can come into existence; hence no honest node votes for 1− b in iteration r + 2
...... A simple induction completes the proof.
Validity. Recall that the very iteration skips Status and Propose and directly starts with Vote. If all honest
nodes have the same input bit b, then they all vote for b in the first iteration. By the end of the first iteration,
every honest node has an iteration-1 certificate for b and no iteration-1 certificate for 1 − b exists. Validity
then follows from consistency.
Expected constant round. Once an iteration has an honest leader, it will sign a unique proposal for the
bit b with the highest certificate reported by honest nodes. Then, all honest nodes send Vote and Commit
messages for b, output and terminate in that iteration. Since leaders are selected at random, in expectation,
an honest leader emerges in two iterations.
C.2 Synchronous Subquadratic BA through Vote-Specific Eligibility
The above simple protocol requires in expectation quadratic communication (in each round every node
multicasts a message). We now improve the complexity of the warmup protocol to subquadratic and we will
remove the idealized leader election oracle in the process too.
We now use the vote-specific eligibility to determine for each iteration, who is eligible for sending
Status Propose, Vote and Commit messages for 0 and 1 respectively. To keep the presentation simple,
we abstract away the cryptographic primitives for eligibility election and model it as an ideal functionality
Fmine. Henceforth, we call an attempt for node i to check eligibility to send a message a mining attempt.
This is inspired by Bitcoin’s terminology where miners “mine” blocks.
Concretely, node i is eligible to send a (T, r, b) where T is Status, Vote, or Commit, iff
Fmine.mine(i, T, r, b) < D,
node i is eligible to send (Terminate, b) iff
Fmine.mine(i, Terminate, b) < D,
and node i is eligible to send (Propose, r, b) iff
Fmine.mine(i, Propose, r, b) < D0.
D and D0 are appropriate difficulty parameters such each Status/Vote/Commit/Terminatemulticast has
a λ/n = ω(log κ)/n probability to be eligible and each leader proposal has a 1/2n probability to be eligible.
We may assume n > λ; otherwise, if n is small, one should simply use the quadratic protocol.
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We use the phrase “node i conditionally multicasts a message” to mean that node i checks with Fmine if
it is eligible to send that message and only multicasts the message if it is. Now, the subquadratic protocol is
almost identical to the warmup protocol except for the following changes:
• every occurrence of multicast is now replaced with “conditionally multicast”;
• every occurrence of f + 1 Vote, Commit, or Terminate messages is now replaced with λ/2 messages
of that type;
• upon receiving every message of the form (i,m) including messages attached with other messages, a
node invokes Fmine.verify(i,m) to verify message’s validity. Note that m can be of the form (T, r, b)
where T ∈ {Status, Vote, Commit, Terminate} or of the form (Terminate, b).
C.3 Proof
We prove our new protocol works in this subsection. The proofs mostly follow the sketch in Section C.1
— except that we now need to analyze the stochastic process induced by eligibility. Our stochastic analysis
here is performed assuming an idealized Fmine, and this idealized oracle will be removed later in Section D.
Recall that n > λ. Throughout the proofs, we will also assume that the adversary makes at most (1/2−
ǫ)n adaptive corruptions where 0 < ǫ < 1/2 is a constant — in this case, the term exp(−Ω(ǫ2λ)) · poly(κ)
would be negligibly small in κ. In particular, Lemma 10 and 11 below show that each bad event we care
about happens with exp(−Ω(λ)) probability. We will then show there are at most poly(κ) such bad events
that we need to take a union bound over.
Lemma 10. Except for exp(−Ω(ǫλ)) probability, if ǫn/2 honest nodes have terminated, all honest nodes
terminate in the next round.
Proof. Each of those ǫn/2 nodes has a λ/n probability to be eligible to send Terminate. The probability
that none of them is eligible is (1 − λ/n)ǫn/2 < exp(−ǫλ/2). Note that the adversary can fully control in
what order honest nodes terminate, but it cannot predict which honest nodes are eligible to send Terminate.
Thus, it cannot bias the above probability. Except for this exponentially small probability, a Terminate
message sent by an honest eligible node makes all honest nodes terminate in the next round.
Lemma 11. Except for exp(−Ω(ǫ2λ)) probability, For any Status/Vote/Commit message for bit b in
iteration r, (i) less than λ/2 already-corrupt nodes are eligible to send it, and (ii) either ǫn/2 honest nodes
have terminated, or at least λ/2 so-far-honest not-yet-terminated nodes are eligible to send it.
Proof. For (i), observe that there are at most (12 − ǫ)n already-corrupt nodes at any time. By our choice of
D, in expectation, at most (12 − ǫ)λ already-corrupt nodes are eligible to send the said message. A simple
Chernoff bound completes the proof.
For (ii), if the “either” part is not true, then there are at least (12 +
ǫ
2)n so-far-honest nodes that have
not terminated. By our choice of D, in expectation, at least (12 +
ǫ
2)λ of them are eligible to send the said
message. A simple Chernoff bound completes the proof.
Lemma 12. Except for exp(−Ω(λ)) probability, in any consecutive λ iterations, a good iteration exists in
which there is a unique so-far-honest leader and no corrupted node is elected leader.
Proof. In any fixed iteration r, there are 2n total attempts to propose (every node can attempt to propose 0
or 1). The probability that one and only one of these attempts succeeds is
(2n
1
)
1
2n(1 −
1
2n)
2n−1. It is not
hard to show (using derivatives) that the above expression decreases as n increases and is greater than 1/e.
With at least 1/2 probability, this successful propose attempt comes from a so-far-honest node. Thus, every
iteration independently has 12e probability to be a good iteration. The probability that none of consecutive λ
iterations is good is (1− 12e)
λ = exp(−Ω(λ)).
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Now we prove consistency, validity, and expected round/communication complexity.
Lemma 13 (Consistency). Except for exp(−Ω(ǫ2λ)) probability, if an honest node outputs a bit b in itera-
tion r, then no certificate for 1− b can be formed in iteration r and all subsequent iterations.
Proof. An honest node outputs b in iteration r, only if it has observed λ/2 Commit messages for b. By
Lemma 11, except for exp(−Ω(ǫ2λ)) probability, one of the Commit messages was sent by a so-far-honest
node henceforth indexed by i∗. Similarly, for an iteration-r certificate for 1−b to exist, except for exp(−Ω(ǫ2λ))
probability, a so-far-honest node has multicast a vote for 1 − b. But in that case, i∗ would have received
this conflicting vote and thus, still being honest by then, would not have sent the Commit message for b.
We have reached a contradiction. Thus, no iteration-r certificate for 1 − b exists except for exp(−Ω(ǫ2λ))
probability.
Furthermore, by the beginning of iteration r+1, all so-far nodes will receive from node i∗ an iteration-r
certificate for b. The lack of iteration-r certificate for 1− b together with the preference to higher certificate
ensures that no honest node will vote for 1− b in iteration r + 1. To form a certificate for 1 − b in a subse-
quent iteration, all λ/2 votes have to come from already-corrupt nodes, which happens with exp(−Ω(ǫ2λ))
probability by Lemma 11.
Lemma 14 (Validity). Except for exp(−Ω(ǫ2λ)) probability, if all honest nodes have the same input bit b,
then all nodes will output b.
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 11: in the first iteration, except for the said probability, there will be
sufficient number of honest nodes to send (Vote, r = 1, b), and there will not be sufficient number of corrupt
nodes to vote for 1− b. Validity then follows from consistency.
Lemma 15 (Efficiency). Except for exp(−Ω(ǫ2λ)) probability, all honest nodes terminate in λ rounds, and
honest nodes collectively send O(nλ2) messages (i.e., O(λ2) multicasts) where each message is at most
O((log κ+ log n)λ)
Proof. By Lemma 12, with at least 12e probability, a single so-far-honest node is elected leader in an iteration.
After this honest leader multicasts a unique proposal, all honest nodes will output and terminate in three
rounds, unless there are insufficient eligible honest nodes to send Vote or Commit messages. Each of the
above bad event happens with exp(−Ω(ǫ2λ)) probability by Lemma 11. Thus, in each iteration, there is a
1
2e − exp(−Ω(ǫ
2λ)) = Θ(1) probability that all nodes terminate. The round complexity claims thus follow
in a straightforward fashion.
By Chernoff bound, except with exp(−Ω(ǫ2λ)) probability, in each iteration, at most 2λ honest nodes
multicast messages. The communication complexity claim thus follows.
Corollary 16. All honest nodes terminate in expected O(1) rounds.
Theorem 17. Let ǫ > 0 be an arbitrarily small constant and λ = ω(log κ) be the expected committee
size in the protocol. The Fmine-hybrid-world Byzantine Agreement protocol in (n, 1/2 − ǫ)-environments
satisfies consistency, validity, λ-termination, and achieves O(λ2 · (log κ+ log n)) multicast communication
complexity.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 13—15.
D Instantiating Fmine in the Real World
So far, all our protocols have assumed the existence of an Fmine ideal functionality. In this section, we
describe how to instantiate the protocols in the real world (where Fmine does not exist) using cryptography.
Technically we do not directly realize the ideal functionality Fmine in the sense of Canetti [6] — instead, we
describe a real-world protocol that preserves all the security properties of the Fmine-hybrid protocols.
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D.1 Preliminary: Adaptively Secure Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We use f(κ) ≈ g(κ) to mean that there exists a negligible function ν(κ) such that |f(κ)− g(κ)| < ν(κ).
A non-interactive proof system henceforth denoted nizk for an NP language L consists of the following
algorithms.
• crs ← Gen(1κ,L): Takes in a security parameter κ, a description of the language L, and generates a
common reference string crs.
• π ← P(crs, stmt, w): Takes in crs, a statement stmt, a witness w such that (stmt, w) ∈ L, and produces
a proof π.
• b← V(crs, stmt, π): Takes in a crs, a statement stmt, and a proof π, and outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
Perfect completeness. A non-interactive proof system is said to be perfectly complete, if an honest prover
with a valid witness can always convince an honest verifier. More formally, for any (stmt, w) ∈ L, we have
that
Pr [crs← Gen(1κ,L), π ← P(crs, stmt, w) : V(crs, stmt, π) = 1] = 1
Non-erasure computational zero-knowledge. Non-erasure zero-knowledge requires that under a simu-
lated CRS, there is a simulated prover that can produce proofs without needing the witness. Further, upon
obtaining a valid witness to a statement a-posteriori, the simulated prover can explain the simulated NIZK
with the correct witness.
We say that a proof system (Gen,P,V) satisfies non-erasure computational zero-knowledge iff there
exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (Gen0,P0,Explain) such that
Pr
[
crs← Gen(1κ),AReal(crs,·,·)(crs) = 1
]
≈ Pr
[
(crs0, τ0)← Gen0(1
κ),AIdeal(crs0,τ0,·,·)(crs0) = 1
]
,
where Real(crs, stmt, w) runs the honest prover P(crs, stmt, w) with randomness r and obtains the proof
π, it then outputs (π, r); Ideal(crs0, τ0, stmt, w) runs the simulated prover π ← P0(crs0, τ0, stmt, ρ) with
randomness ρ and without a witness, and then runs r ← Explain(crs0, τ0, stmt, w, ρ) and outputs (π, r).
Perfect knowledge extration. We say that a proof system (Gen,P,V) satisfies perfect knowledge extraction,
if there exists probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Gen1,Extr), such that for all (even unbounded)
adversary A,
Pr [crs← Gen(1κ) : A(crs) = 1] = Pr [(crs1, τ1)← Gen1(1
κ) : A(crs1) = 1] ,
and moreover,
Pr
[
(crs1, τ1)← Gen1(1
κ); (stmt, π)← A(crs1);w ← Extr(crs1, τ1, stmt, π) :
V(crs1, stmt, π) = 1
but (stmt, w) /∈ L
]
= 0
D.2 Adaptively Secure Non-Interactive Commitment Scheme
An adaptively secure non-interactive commitment scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• crs← Gen(1κ): Takes in a security parameter κ, and generates a common reference string crs.
• C ← com(crs, v, ρ): Takes in crs, a value v, and a random string ρ, and outputs a committed value C .
• b← ver(crs, C, v, ρ): Takes in a crs, a commitment C , a purported opening (v, ρ), and outputs 0 (reject)
or 1 (accept).
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Computationally hiding under selective opening. We say that a commitment scheme (Gen, com, ver) is
computationally hiding under selective opening, iff there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
(Gen0, com0,Explain) such that
Pr
[
crs← Gen(1κ),AReal(crs,·)(crs) = 1
]
≈ Pr
[
(crs0, τ0)← Gen0(1
κ),AIdeal(crs0,τ0,·)(crs0) = 1
]
where Real(crs, v) runs the honest algorithm com(crs, v, r) with randomness r and obtains the commitment
C , it then outputs (C, r); Ideal(crs0, τ0, v) runs the simulated algorithm C ← comm0(crs0, τ0, ρ) with
randomness ρ and without v, and then runs r← Explain(crs0, τ0, v, ρ) and outputs (C, r).
Perfectly binding. A commitment scheme is said to be perfectly binding iff for every crs in the support
of the honest CRS generation algorithm, there does not exist (v, ρ) 6= (v′, ρ′) such that com(crs, v, ρ) =
com(crs, v′, ρ′).
Theorem 18 (Instantiation of our NIZK and commitment schemes [19]). Assume standard bilinear group
assumptions. Then, there exists a proof system that satisfies perfect completeness, non-erasure computa-
tional zero-knowledge, and perfect knowledge extraction. Further, there exist a commitment scheme that is
perfectly binding and computationally hiding under selective opening.
Proof. The existence of such a NIZK scheme was shown by Groth et al. [19] via a building block that
they called homomorphic proof commitment scheme. This building block can also be used to achieve a
commitment scheme with the desired properties.
D.3 NP Language Used in Our Construction
In our construction, we will use the following NP language L. A pair (stmt, w) ∈ L iff
• parse stmt := (ρ, c, crscomm,m), parse w := (sk, s);
• it must hold that c = comm(crscomm, sk, s), and PRFsk(m) = ρ.
D.4 Compiler from Fmine-Hybrid Protocols to Real-World Protocols
Our real-world protocol will remove the Fmine oracle by leveraging cryptographic building blocks including
a pseudorandom function family, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system that satisfies computational
zero-knowledge and computational soundness, and a perfectly binding and computationally hiding commit-
ment scheme.
Earlier in Section 1, we have described the intuition behind our approach. Hence in this section we
directly provide a formal description of how to compile our Fmine-hybrid protocols into real-world protocols
using cryptography. This compilation works for our previous Fmine-hybrid protocol described in Section C.
The high-level idea is to realize an adaptively secure VRF from adaptively secure PRFs and NIZKs:
• Trusted PKI setup. Upfront, a trusted party runs the CRS generation algorithms of the commitment
and the NIZK scheme to obtain crscomm and crsnizk. It then chooses a secret PRF key for every node,
where the i-th node has key ski. It publishes (crscomm, crsnizk) as the public parameters, and each node
i’s public key denoted pki is computed as a commitment of ski using a random string si. The collection
of all users’ public keys is published to form the PKI, i.e., the mapping from each node i to its public
key pki is public information. Further, each node i is given the secret key (ski, si).
• Instantiating Fmine.mine. Recall that in the ideal-world protocol a node i calls Fmine.mine(m) to mine
a vote for a message m. Now, instead, the node i calls ρ := PRFski(m), and computes the NIZK proof
π := nizk.P((ρ, pki, crscomm,m), (ski, si))
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where si the randomness used in committing ski during the trusted setup. Intuitively, this zero-knowledge
proof proves that the evaluation outcome ρ is correct w.r.t. the node’s public key (which is a commitment
of its secret key).
The mining attempt for m is considered successful if ρ < Dp where Dp is an appropriate difficulty
parameter such that any random string of appropriate length is less than Dp with probability p — recall
that the parameter p is selected in a way that depends on the message m being “mined”.
• New message format. Recall that earlier in our Fmine-hybrid protocols, every message multicast by a
so-far-honest node i must of one of the following forms:
– Mined messages of the form (m, i)where node i has successfully calledFmine.mine(m); For example,
in the synchronous honest majority protocol (Section C), m can be of the form (T, r, b) where T ∈
{Propose, Vote, Commit, Status}, r denotes an epoch number, and b ∈ {0, 1,⊥}; or of the form
(Terminate, b).
– Compound messages, i.e., a concatenation of the above types of messages.
For every mined message (m, i) that is either stand-alone or contained in a compound message, in the
real-world protocol, we rewrite (m, i) as (m, i, ρ, π) where the terms ρ and π are defined in the most
natural manner:
– If (m, i) is part of a message that a so-far-honest node i wants to multicast, then the terms ρ and π are
those generated by i in place of calling Fmine.mine(m) in the real world (as explained above);
– Else, if (m, i) is part of a message that a so-far-honest node j 6= i wants to multicast, it must be that
j has received a valid real-world tuple (m, i, ρ, π) where validity will be defined shortly, and thus ρ
and π are simply the terms contained in this tuple.
• Instantiating Fmine.verify. In the ideal world, a node would call Fmine.verify to check the validity
of mined messages upon receiving them (possibly contained in compound messages). In the real-world
protocol, we perform the following instead: upon receiving the mined message (m, i, ρ, π) that is possibly
contained in compound messages, a node can verify the message’s validity by checking:
1. ρ < Dp where p is an appropriate difficulty parameter that depends on the type of the mined message;
and
2. π is indeed a valid NIZK for the statement formed by the tuple (ρ, pki, crscomm,m). The tuple is
discarded unless both checks pass.
D.5 Main Theorems for Real-World Protocols
After applying the above compiler to our Fmine-hybrid protocols described in Appendix C. we obtain our
real-world protocol In this section, we present our main theorem statements for these three settings. The
proofs for these theorems can be derived by combining the proofs in Appendix C as well as those in the
following section, i.e., Appendix E where will show that the relevant security properties are preserved in the
real world as long as the cryptographic building blocks are secure.
In theorem statement below, when we say that “assume that the cryptographic building blocks employed
are secure”, we formally mean that 1) the pseudorandom function family employed is secure; 2) the non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof system that satisfies non-erasure computational zero-knowledge and per-
fect knowledge extraction; 3) the commitment scheme is computationally hiding under selective opening
and perfectly binding; and 4) the signature scheme is secure (if relevant).
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Theorem 19 (Synchronous network with honest majority). Let πhonestmaj be the protocol obtained by ap-
plying the above compiler to the protocol in Section C, and assume that the cryptographic building blocks
employed are secure. Then, for any arbitrarily small positive constant ǫ, any n ∈ N, πhonestmaj satisfies
consistency, validity, and poly log(κ)-termination in (n, 12 − ǫ)-environments for a suitable polynomial func-
tion poly(·). Further, πhonestmaj achieves expected constant round and χ · poly log(κ) multicast message
complexity where χ is a security parameter related to the hardness of the cryptographic building blocks, and
poly(·) denotes another suitable polynomial function.
Proof. The proof of this theorem can be obtained by combining the Fmine-hybrid analysis in Appendix C
as well as Appendix E where we show that the relevant security properties are preserved in by the real world
protocol.
E Real World is as Secure as the Fmine-Hybrid World
E.1 Preliminary: PRF’s Security Under Selective Opening
Our proof will directly rely on the security of a PRF under selective opening attacks. We will prove that any
secure PRF family is secure under selective opening with a polynomial loss in the security.
Pseudorandomness under selective opening. We consider a selective opening adversary that interacts
with a challenger. The adversary can request to create new PRF instances, query existing instances with
specified messages, selectively corrupt instances and obtain the secret keys of these instances, and finally,
we would like to claim that for instances that have not been corrupt, the adversary is unable to distinguish the
PRFs’ evaluation outcomes on any future message from random values from an appropriate domain. More
formally, we consider the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
ExptAb (1
κ):
• A(1κ) can adaptively interact with C through the following queries:
– Create instance. The challenger C creates a new PRF instance by calling the honest Gen(1κ). Hence-
forth, the instance will be assigned an index that corresponds to the number of “create instance”
queries made so far. The i-th instance’s secret key will be denoted ski.
– Evaluate. The adversary A specifies an index i that corresponds to an instance already created and a
message m, and the challenger computes r ← PRFski(m) and returns r to A.
– Corrupt. The adversary A specifies an index i, and the challenger C returns ski to A (if the i-th
instance has been created).
– Challenge. The adversary A specifies an index i∗ that must have been created and a message m.
If b = 0, the challenger returns a completely random string of appropriate length. If b = 1, the
challenger computes r ← PRFski∗ (m) and returns r to the adversary.
We say that A is compliant iff with probability 1, the challenge tuple (i∗,m) satisfies the following: 1)
A does not make a corruption query on i∗ throughout the game; and 2) A does not make any evaluation
query on the tuple (i∗,m).
Definition 20 (Selective opening security of a PRF family). We say that a PRF scheme satisfies pseudo-
randomness under selective opening iff for any compliant p.p.t. adversary A, its views in ExptA0 (1
κ) and
ExptA1 (1
κ) are computationally indistinguishable.
Theorem 21. Any secure PRF family satisfies pseudorandomness under selective opening by Definition 20
(with polynomial loss in the security reduction).
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Proof. Single-selective-challenge selective opening security. In the single-selective challenge version of
the game, the adversary commits to a challenge identifier i∗ upfront during the security game, such that later,
challenge queries can only be made for the committed index i∗.
First, we can show that any secure PRF family would satisfy single-selective-challenge selective opening
security. Suppose that there is an efficient adversaryA that can break the single-selective-challenge selective
opening security game for some PRF family. We construct a reduction R that leverages A to break the
PRF’s security. The reduction R interacts with a PRF challenger as well asA. R generates PRF keys for all
instances other than i∗ and answers non-i∗ evaluation and corruption queries honestly. For i∗,A’s evaluation
requests are forwarded to the PRF challenger.
We consider the following three hybrids:
1. The PRF challenger has a real, randomly sampled PRF function from the corresponding family, and R
answers A’s challenge queries on i∗ with random answers;
2. The PRF challenger has a random function, and R answers A’s challenge queries on i∗ by forwarding
the PRF challenger’s answers (or equivalently by relying with random answers); and
3. The PRF challenger has a real, randomly sampled PRF function from the corresponding family, and R
answers A’s challenge queries on i∗ by forwarding the PRF challenger’s answers.
It is not difficult to see that A’s view in hybrid 1 is identical to its view in the single-selective challenge
selective opening security game when b = 0; its view in hybrid 3 is identical to its view in the single-
selective challenge selective opening security game when b = 1. Due to the security of the PRF, it is not
difficult to see that any adjacent pair of hybrids are indistinguishable.
Single-challenge selective opening security. In the single-challenge selective opening version of the game,
the adversary can only make challenge queries for a single i∗ but it need not commit to i∗ upfront at the
beginning of the security game.
We now argue that any PRF that satisfies single-selective-challenge selective opening security must
satisfy single-challenge selective opening security with a polynomial security loss. The proof of this is
straightforward. Suppose that there is an efficient adversary A that can break the single-challenge selective
opening security of some PRF family, we can then construct an efficient reduction R that breaks the single-
selective-challenge selective opening security of the PRF family. Basically the reduction R guesses at
random upfront which index i∗ the adversary A will choose for challenge queries. R then forwards all of
A’s queries to the challenger of the single-selective-challenge selective opening security security game. If
the guess later turns out to be wrong, the reduction simply aborts and outputs a random guess b′. Otherwise,
it outputs the same output as A. Suppose that A creates q instances of PRFs then we can conclude that
R guesses correctly with probability at least 1/q. Thus whatever advantage A has in breaking the single-
challenge selective opening security, R has an advantage that is 1/q fraction of A’s advantage in breaking
the single-selective-challenge selective opening security of the PRF family.
Selective opening security. Finally, we show that any PRF family that satisfies single-challenge selective
opening security must also satisfy selective opening security (i.e., Definition 20) with a polynomial security
loss. This proof can be completed through a standard hybrid argument in which we replace the challenge
queries from real to random one index at a time (where replacement is performed for all queries of the i-th
new index that appeared in some challenge query).
E.2 Definition of Polynomial-Time Checkable Stochastic Bad Events
In all of our Fmine-hybrid protocols earlier, some stochastic bad events related to Fmine’s random coins can
lead to the breach of protocol security (i.e., consistency, validity, or termination) These stochastic bad events
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are of the form imprecisely speaking: either there are too few honest mining successes or there are too many
corrupt mining successes. More formally, for the honest majority protocol, the stochastic bad events are
stated in Lemmas 10, 11 and 12.
For these stochastic bad events, there is a polynomial-time predicate henceforth denoted F , that takes in
1) all honest and corrupt mining attempts and the rounds in which the attempts are made (for a fixed view)
and 2) Fmine’s coins as a result of these mining attempts, and outputs 0 or 1, indicating whether the bad
events are true for this specific view.
In our earlier Fmine-world analyses (in Appendix C), although we have not pointed out this explicitly,
but our proofs actually suggest that the stochastic bad events defined by F happen with small probability
even when A and Z are computationally unbounded.
The majority of this section will focus on bounding the second category of failures, i.e., stochastic bad
events defined by the polynomial-time predicate F (where F may be a different predicate for each protocol).
For simplicity, we shall call our Fmine-hybrid protocol Πideal — for the three different protocols, Πideal
is a different protocol; nonetheless, the same proofs hold for all three protocols.
E.3 Hybrid 1
Hybrid 1 is defined just like our earlier Fmine-hybrid protocol but with the following modifications:
• Fmine chooses random PRF keys for all nodes at the very beginning, and let ski denote the PRF key
chosen for the i-th node.
• Whenever a node i makes a mine(m) query, Fmine determines the outcome of the coin flip as follows:
compute ρ← PRFski(m) and use ρ < Dp as the coin.
• Whenever A adaptively corrupts a node i, Fmine discloses ski to A.
Lemma 22. For any p.p.t. (A,Z), there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for any κ, the bad
events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1 with probability 1− negl(κ).
Proof. Let f be the number of adaptive corruptions made by A. To prove this lemma we must go through a
sequence of inner hybrids over the number of adaptive corruptions made by the adversary A.
Hybrid 1.f . Hybrid 1.f is defined almost identically as Hybrid 1 except the following modifications: Sup-
pose that A makes the last corruption query in round t and for node i. Whenever the ideal functionality
Fmine in Hybrid 1 would have called PRFskj(m) for any j that is honest-forever and in some round t
′ ≥ t,
in Hybrid 1.f , we replace this call with a random string.
Claim 23. Suppose that the PRF scheme satisfies pseudorandomness under selective opening. Then, if for
any p.p.t. (A,Z) and any κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1.f with probability at
least µ(κ), then for any p.p.t. (A,Z) and κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1 with
probability at least µ(κ)− negl(κ).
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the claim does not hold. We can then construct a PRF
adversary A′ that breaks pseudorandomness under selective opening with non-negligible probability. A′
plays Fmine when interacting with A. A
′ is also interacting with a PRF challenger. In the beginning, for
every node, A′ asks the PRF challenger to create a PRF instance for that node. Whenever Fmine needs
to evaluate a PRF, A′ forwards the query to the PRF challenger. This continues until A makes the last
corruption query, i.e., the f -th corruption query — suppose this last corruption query is made in round t
and the node to corrupt is i. At this moment, A′ discloses ski to the adversary. However, whenever Hybrid
1 would have needed to compute PRFskj (m) for any j that is honest-forever and in some round t
′ ≥ t, A′
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makes a challenge query to the PRF challenger for the j-th PRF instance and on the message queried. Notice
that if the PRF challenger returned random answers to challenges, A’s view in this interation would be
identically distributed as Hybrid 1.f . Otherwise, if the PRF challenger returned true answers to challenges,
A’s view in this interation would be identically distributed as Hybrid 1.
Hybrid 1.f ′. Hybrid 1.f ′ is defined almost identically as Hybrid 1.f except the following modification:
whenever A makes the last corruption query — suppose that this query is to corrupt node i and happens in
round t— the ideal functionality Fmine does not disclose ski to A.
Claim 24. If for any p.p.t. (A,Z) and any κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1.f ′
with probability at least µ(κ), then for any p.p.t. (A,Z) and κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen
in Hybrid 1.f with probability at least µ(κ).
Proof. We observe the following: once the last corruption query is made in round t for node i, given that
for any t′ ≥ t, any honest-forever node’s coins are completely random. Thus whether or not the adversary
receives the last corruption key does not help it to cause the relevant bad events to occur. Specifically in this
case, at the moment the last corruption query is made— without loss of generality assume that the adversary
makes all possible corrupt mining attempts — then whether the polynomial-checkable bad events defined
by F take place is fully determined by Fmine’s random coins and independent of any further actions of the
adversary at this point.
Hybrid 1.f ′′. Hybrid 1.f ′′ is defined almost identically as Hybrid 1.f ′ except the following modification:
suppose that the last corruption query is to corrupt node i and happens in round t; whenever the ideal
functionality Fmine in Hybrid 1.f
′ would have called PRF(ski,m) in some round t
′ ≥ t (for the node i that
is last corrupt), in Hybrid 1.f ′′, we replace this call’s outcome with a random string.
Claim 25. Suppose that the PRF scheme satisfies pseudorandomness under selective opening. Then, if for
any p.p.t. (A,Z) and any κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1.f ′′ with probability at
least µ(κ), then for any p.p.t. (A,Z) and κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1.f ′ with
probability at least µ(κ)− negl(κ).
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the claim does not hold. We can then construct a PRF
adversary A′ that breaks pseudorandomness under selective opening with non-negligible probability. A′
plays the Fmine when interacting with A. A
′ is also interacting with a PRF challenger. In the beginning,
for every node, A′ asks the PRF challenger to create a PRF instance for that node. Whenever Fmine needs
to evaluate a PRF, A′ forwards the query to the PRF challenger. This continues until A makes the last
corruption query, i.e., the f -th corruption query — suppose this last corruption query is made in round
t and the node to corrupt is i. At this moment, A′ does not disclose ski to the adversary and does not
query the PRF challenger to corrupt i’s secret key either. Furthermore, whenever Hybrid 1.f ′ would have
called PRFski(m) in some round t
′ ≥ t, A now calls the PRF challenger for the i-th PRF instance and
on the specified challenge message, it uses the answer from the PRF challenger to replace the PRFski(m)
call. Notice that if the PRF challenger returned random answers to challenges, A’s view in this interation
would be identically distributed as Hybrid 1.f ′′. Otherwise, if the PRF challenger returned true answers to
challenges, A’s view in this interation would be identically distributed as Hybrid 1.f ′.
We can extend the same argument continuing with the following sequence of hybrids such that we can
replace more and more PRF evaluations at the end with random coins, and withhold more and more PRF
secret keys from A upon adaptive corruption queries — and nonetheless the probability that the security
properties get broken will not be affected too much.
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Hybrid 1.(f − 1). Suppose that A makes the last but second corruption query for node i and in round t.
Now, for any node j that is still honest in round t (not including node i), if PRFskj(m) is needed by the ideal
functionality in some round t′ ≥ t, the PRF call’s outcome will be replaced with random. Otherwise Hybrid
1.(f − 1) is the same as Hybrid 1.f ′′.
Claim 26. Suppose that the PRF scheme satisfies pseudorandomness under selective opening. Then, if for
any p.p.t. (A,Z) and any κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1.(f −1) with probability
at least µ(κ), then for any p.p.t. (A,Z) and κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1.f ′′
with probability at least µ(κ)− negl(κ).
Proof. Similar to the reduction between the Fmine-hybrid protocol and Hybrid 1.f .
Hybrid 1.(f − 1)′. Almost the same as Hybrid 1.(f − 1), but without disclosing the secret key to A upon
the last but second corruption query.
Claim 27. If for any p.p.t. (A,Z) and any κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1.(f−1)′
with probability at least 1−µ(κ), then for any p.p.t. (A,Z) and κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen
in Hybrid 1.(f − 1) with probability at least 1− µ(κ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the reduction between Hybrid 1.f and Hybrid 1.f ′, but with one more subtlety:
in Hybrid 1.(f −1), upon making the last but second adaptive corruption query for node i in round t, for any
t′ ≥ t and any node honest in round t (not including i but including the last node to corrupt), all coins are
random. Due to this, we observe that if there is a p.p.t. adversary A that can cause the bad events defined
by F to occur with probability µ for Hybrid 1.(f − 1), then there is another p.p.t. adversary A′ such that
upon making the last but second corruption query, it would immediately make the last corruption query in
the same round as t corrupting an arbitrary node (say, the one with the smallest index and is not corrupt yet),
and A′ can cause the bad events defined by F to occur with probability at least µ in Hybrid 1.(f − 1).
Now, we argue that if such an A′ can cause the bad events defined by F to occur in Hybrid 1.(f − 1)
with probability µ, there must be an adversary A′′ that can cause the bad events defined by F to occur in
Hybrid 1.(f − 1)′ with probability µ too. In particular, A′′ will simply run A′ until A′ makes the last but
second corruption query. At this point A′′ makes an additional corruption query for an arbitrary node that
is not yet corrupt. At this point, clearly whether bad events defined by F would occur is independent of any
further action of the adversary — and although in Hybrid 1.(f − 1)′, A′′ does not get to see the secret key
corresponding to the last but second query, it still has the same probability of causing the relevant bad events
to occur as the adversary A′ in Hybrid 1.(f − 1).
Hybrid 1.(f − 1)′′. Suppose that A makes the last but second corruption query for node i and in round t.
Now, for any node j that is still honest in round t as well as node j = i, if the ideal functionality needs to
call PRFskj(m) in some round t
′ ≥ t the PRF’s outcome will be replaced with random. Otherwise Hybrid
1.(f − 1)′′ is identical to 1.(f − 1)′.
Due to the same argument as that of Claim 25, we may conclude that if for any p.p.t. (A,Z) and any κ,
the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1.(f − 1)′′ with probability at least µ(κ), then for any
p.p.t. (A,Z) and κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1.(f − 1)′ with probability at least
µ(κ)− negl(κ).
In this manner, we define a sequence of hybrids till in the end, we reach the following hybrid:
Hybrid 1.0. All PRFs evaluations in Hybrid 1 are replaced with random, and no secret keys are disclosed
to A upon any adaptive corruption query.
It is not difficult to see that Hybrid 1.0 is identically distributed as the Fmine-hybrid protocol. We thus
conclude the proof of Lemma 22.
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E.4 Hybrid 2
Hybrid 2 is defined almost identically as Hybrid 1, except that now the following occurs:
• Upfront, Fmine generates an honest CRS for the commitment scheme and the NIZK scheme and discloses
the CRS to A.
• Upfront, Fmine not only chooses secret keys for all nodes, but commits to the secret keys of these nodes,
and reveals the commitments to A.
• Every time Fmine receives a mine query from a so-far-honest node i and for the message m, it evaluates
ρ← PRFski(m) and compute a NIZK proof denoted π to vouch for ρ. Now, Fmine returns ρ and π to A.
• Whenever a node i becomes corrupt, Fmine reveals all secret randomness node i has used in commitments
and NIZKs so far to A in addition to revealing its PRF secret key ski.
Lemma 28. Suppose that the commitment scheme is computationally adaptive hiding under selective open-
ing, and the NIZK scheme is non-erasure computational zero-knowledge, Then, for any p.p.t. (A,Z), there
exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for any κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid
2 with probability 1− negl(κ).
Proof. The proof is standard and proceeds in the following internal hybrid steps.
• Hybrid 2.A. Hybrid 2.A is the same as Hybrid 2 but with the following modifications. Fmine calls
simulated NIZK key generation instead of the real one, and for nodes that remain honest so-far, Fmine
simulate their NIZK proofs without needing the nodes’ PRF secret keys. Whenever an honest node i
becomes corrupt, Fmine explains node i’s simulated NIZKs using node i’s real ski and randomness used
in its commitment, and supplies the explanations to A.
Claim 29. Hybrid 2.A and Hybrid 2 are computationally indistinguishable from the view of Z .
Proof. Straightforward due to the non-erasure computational zero-knowledge property of the NIZK.
• Hybrid 2.B. Hybrid 2.B is almost identical to Hybrid 2.A but with the following modifications. Fmine
calls the simulated CRS generation for the commitment scheme. When generating public keys for nodes,
it computes simulated commitments without using the nodes’ real ski’s. When a node i becomes cor-
rupt, it will use the real ski to compute an explanation for the earlier simulated commitment. Now this
explanation is supplied to the NIZK’s explain algorithm to explain the NIZK too.
Claim 30. Hybrid 2.A and Hybrid 2.B are computationally indistinguishable from the view of the envi-
ronment Z .
Proof. Straightforward by the “computational hiding under selective opening” property of the commit-
ment scheme.
Claim 31. If for any p.p.t. (A,Z) and any κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 1 with
probability at least µ(κ), then for any p.p.t. (A,Z) and κ, then the bad events defined by F do not happen
in Hybrid 2.B with probability at least µ(κ).
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Proof. Given an adversary A that attacks Hybrid 2.B, we can construct an adversary A′ that attacks Hybrid
1. A′ will run A internally. A′ runs the simulated CRS generations algorithms for the commitment and
NIZK, and sends the simulated CRSes to A. It then runs the simulated commitment scheme and sends
simulated commitments to A (of randomly chosen ski for every i). Whenever A tries to mine a message,
A′ can intercept this mining request, forward it to its own Fmine. If successful, A
′ can sample a random
number ρ > Dp; else it samples a random number ρ ≤ Dp. It then calls the simulated NIZK prover using
ρ to simulate a NIZK proof and sends it to A. Whenever A wants to corrupt a node i, A′ corrupts it with
its Fmine, obtains ski, and then runs the Explain algorithms of the commitment and NIZK schemes and
discloses the explanations to A. Clearly A’s view in this protocol is identically distributed as in Hybrid 2.B.
Moreover, if A succeedings in causing the bad events defined by F to happen, clearly A′ will too.
E.5 Hybrid 3
Hybrid 3 is almost identical as Hybrid 2 except with the following modifications. Whenever an already
corrupt node makes a mining query to Fmine, it must supply a ρ and a NIZK proof π. Fmine then verifies
the NIZK proof π, and if verification passes, it uses ρ < Dp as the result of the coin flip.
Lemma 32. Assume that the commitment scheme is perfectly binding, and the NIZK scheme satisfies perfect
knowledge extraction. Then, for any p.p.t. (A,Z), there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for any
κ, the bad events defined by F do not happen in Hybrid 3 except with probability negl(κ).
Proof. We can replace the NIZK’s CRS generation Gen with Gen1 which generates a CRS that is identically
distributed as the honest Gen, but additionally generates an extraction trapdoor denoted τ1. Now, upon
receiving A’s NIZK proof π, Fmine performs extraction. The lemma follows by observing that due to the
perfect knowledge extraction of the NIZK and the perfect binding property of the commitment scheme, it
holds except with negligible probability that the extracted witness does not match the node’s PRF secret key
that Fmine had chosen upfront.
In the lemma below, when we say that “assume that the cryptographic building blocks employed are
secure”, we formally mean that the pseudorandom function family employed is secure; the non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof system that satisfies non-erasure computational zero-knowledge and perfect knowl-
edge extraction; the commitment scheme is computationally hiding under selective opening and perfectly
binding; and for the synchronous honest majority protocol, additionally assume that the signature scheme is
secure.
Lemma 33. Assume the cryptographic building blocks employed are secure. Then, for any p.p.t. (A,Z),
there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for any κ ∈ N, relevant security properties (including
consistency, validity, and termination) are preseved with all but negl(κ) probability in Hybrid 3.
Proof. As mentioned, only two types of bad events can possibly lead to breach of the relevant security
properties: 1) signature failure; and 2) bad events defined by F . Thus the lemma follows in a straightforward
fashion by taking a union bound over the two.
E.6 Real-World Execution
We now show that the real-world protocol is just as secure as Hybrid 3 — recall that the security properties
we care about include consistency, validity, and termination.
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Lemma 34. If there is some p.p.t. (A,Z) that causes the relevant security properties to be broken in the
real world with probability µ, then there is some p.p.t. A′ such that (A′,Z) can cause the relevant security
properties to be broken in Hybrid 3 with probability at least µ.
Proof. We construct the following A′:
• A′ obtains CRSes for the NIZK and the commitment scheme from its Fmine and forwards them toA. A
′
also forwards the PKI it learns from Fmine to A.
• Whenever A corrupts some node, A′ does the same with its Fmine, and forwards whatever learned to A.
• WheneverA sends some message to an honest node, for any portion of the message that is a “mined mes-
sage” of any type, let (m, ρ, π) denote this mined message — we assume that m contains the purported
miner of this message denoted i.
– A′ checks the validity of π and that ρ < Dp for an appropriate choice of p depending on the message’s
type; ignore the message if the checks fail;
– if the purported sender i is an honest node and node i has not successfully minedm withFmine, record
a forgery event and simply ignore this message. Otherwise, continue with the following steps.
– if the purported sender i is a corrupt node: A′ issues a corresponding mining attempt to Fmine on
behalf of i with the corresponding ρ and π if no such mining attempt has been made before;
– Finally, A′ forwards m to the destined honest on behalf of the corrupt sender.
• WheneverA′ receives some message from an honest node (of Hybrid 3): for every portion of the message
that is a “mined message” of any type, at this point A′ must have heard from Fmine the corresponding ρ,
and π terms. A′ augments the message with these terms and forwards the resulting message to A.
Note that conditioned on views (determined by all randomness of the execution) with no forgery event
then either the relevant bad events occur both in Hybrid 2 and the real-world execution, or occur in neither.
For views with forgery events, it is not difficult to see that if Hybrid 2 (on this view) does not incur the
relevant bad events, then neither would the real-world execution (for this view).
Proof. Single-selective-challenge selective opening security. In the single-selective challenge version of
the game, the adversary commits to a challenge identifier i∗ upfront during the security game, such that later,
challenge queries can only be made for the committed index i∗.
First, we can show that any secure PRF family would satisfy single-selective-challenge selective opening
security. Suppose that there is an efficient adversaryA that can break the single-selective-challenge selective
opening security game for some PRF family. We construct a reduction R that leverages A to break the
PRF’s security. The reduction R interacts with a PRF challenger as well asA. R generates PRF keys for all
instances other than i∗ and answers non-i∗ evaluation and corruption queries honestly. For i∗,A’s evaluation
requests are forwarded to the PRF challenger.
We consider the following three hybrids:
1. The PRF challenger has a real, randomly sampled PRF function from the corresponding family, and R
answers A’s challenge queries on i∗ with random answers;
2. The PRF challenger has a random function, and R answers A’s challenge queries on i∗ by forwarding
the PRF challenger’s answers (or equivalently by relying with random answers); and
3. The PRF challenger has a real, randomly sampled PRF function from the corresponding family, and R
answers A’s challenge queries on i∗ by forwarding the PRF challenger’s answers.
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It is not difficult to see that A’s view in hybrid 1 is identical to its view in the single-selective challenge
selective opening security game when b = 0; its view in hybrid 3 is identical to its view in the single-
selective challenge selective opening security game when b = 1. Due to the security of the PRF, it is not
difficult to see that any adjacent pair of hybrids are indistinguishable.
Single-challenge selective opening security. In the single-challenge selective opening version of the game,
the adversary can only make challenge queries for a single i∗ but it need not commit to i∗ upfront at the
beginning of the security game.
We now argue that any PRF that satisfies single-selective-challenge selective opening security must
satisfy single-challenge selective opening security with a polynomial security loss. The proof of this is
straightforward. Suppose that there is an efficient adversary A that can break the single-challenge selective
opening security of some PRF family, we can then construct an efficient reduction R that breaks the single-
selective-challenge selective opening security of the PRF family. Basically the reduction R guesses at
random upfront which index i∗ the adversary A will choose for challenge queries. R then forwards all of
A’s queries to the challenger of the single-selective-challenge selective opening security security game. If
the guess later turns out to be wrong, the reduction simply aborts and outputs a random guess b′. Otherwise,
it outputs the same output as A. Suppose that A creates q instances of PRFs then we can conclude that
R guesses correctly with probability at least 1/q. Thus whatever advantage A has in breaking the single-
challenge selective opening security, R has an advantage that is 1/q fraction of A’s advantage in breaking
the single-selective-challenge selective opening security of the PRF family.
Selective opening security. Finally, we show that any PRF family that satisfies single-challenge selective
opening security must also satisfy selective opening security (i.e., Definition 20) with a polynomial security
loss. This proof can be completed through a standard hybrid argument in which we replace the challenge
queries from real to random one index at a time (where replacement is performed for all queries of the i-th
new index that appeared in some challenge query).
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